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It would seem rash to say that Justice Stone in his dissenting
opinion in the recent case holding invalid the A.A.A. legislation
(U.S. v. Bietlel, 56 S. Ct. 312), puts a greater limitation upon
the spending power of Congress than does Justice Roberts in
his majority opinion. Justice Stone certainly did not think so
nor does his conclusion that the A.A.A. legislation was valid
bear out any such contention. However, he does put a limita-
tion in his opinion upon the spending power of Congress which,
one might well argue, would if logically applied have that ef-
fect. In discussing the nature of this power he says, "The
power to tax and spend is not without constitutional restraints.
One restraint is that this power must be truly national. Another
is that it may not be msed to coerce action left to state control."
In saying this he had in mind no doubt the cases which have
held such a limitation applies in respect to the power of Con-
gress to tax. The Supreme Court has many times as in the
Child Labor Tax Case (259 U.S. 20, 42 S. Ct. 449, 66 L. Ed.
817, 1922) Linderv. U. S. (268 U.S. 5, 45 S. Ct. 446, 69 L.
Ed. 819, 1925), and in the recent case U. S. v. Constantine (56
S. Ct. 223, 8o L. Ed. 195, 1935) held that such a levy is not a
tax at all but a penalty. The significance of this distinction dis-
appears, however, when applied to the spending power. You
cannot by definition destroy the spending power by calling it a
penalty, for every withholding of a grant of money unless cer-
tain standards are met is a penalty. Congress has made many
appropriations of money with such conditions attached, instances
of which are the appropriations for vocational education to land
grant colleges; to aid states in the building of roads and in the
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recent enactments in regard to social legislation. When it
comes to the spending power, moreover, the distinction between
coercion and procurement of voluntary action is illusory. Ex-
cept for mechanical control every man in the last analysis acts
voluntarily. He does what he wants to do. "Money or your
life" gives a man the alternative choice. He chooses that which
he prefers. The alternative result may be either the withhold-
ing of a benefit or the imposition of a penalty. It is all the same
for to the extent that the alternative leads one to a choice he
would not have made except for the necessary alternative to
that extent he is coerced. It has been recently said in Ohio as a
justification for not reducing the appropriation for highway con-
struction that this could not be done for to do so would mean
the loss of the federal grant. In this way is compulsion brought
about.
If the withholding of a conditional grant of funds is a form
of coercion, then the limitation laid down by Justice Stone that
the spending power may not be used "to coerce action left to
'state control' would render void all congressional appropria-D
tions which are conditioned upon the doing of things which in
themselves are not subject to federal regulation but 'left to
state control.' "
Justice Roberts speaking for the majority of the court does
not go this far by a long way. In discussing the extent of the
spending power he says "We are not here concerned with a
conditional appropriation of money nor with a provision that
if certain conditions are not complied with the appropriation
shall no longer be available.... There is an obvious difference
between a statute stating the conditions upon which money shall
be expended and one effective only upon assumption of a con-
tractual obligation to submit to a regulation which otherwise
could not be enforced. Many examples pointing this distinc-
tion might be cited."
This then is the reason for suggesting that Justice Stone's
test puts a greater limitation upon the spending power of Con-
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gress than does the test laid down by Justice Roberts, for if
"coercion" be the test then many conditional appropriations by
Congress would be void by the former but valid by the latter.
This discussion about the difference between coercion and
procurement in the spending power may seem unimportant and
it is. It is only made important by the fact that the distinction
is insisted upon in the dissenting opinion of Justice Stone.
The important thing is not how a result is obtained but what
the obtained result is. If the result obtained be such an exercise
of power of regulation by Congress in the field left by the con-
stitution to the control of the states that it cannot be reconciled
with our federal system and the ioth amendment then the court
has no other alternative but to declare the whole thing, means
and all, void.
It becomes then a question of degree and as Justice Cardozo
has said, "the law is not indifferent to considerations of degree."
The majority opinion holds that some such congressional con-
trol is allowed but when it comes to securing a contractual obli-
ogation on the part of the individual to a detailed and extensive
regulation by Congress of conduct supposed to be the sole con-
cern of the states it has gone too far.
In doing this the Supreme Court is but doing what it has
been doing all along for over half a century and that is trying
to give to the plenary powers granted to Congress an interpre-
tation that will recognize the complete plenary character of
these powers and at the same time preserve the federal system
and the reserved power of the states. John Marshall saw this
problem when in McCullough v. Md. he said, "If any propo-
sition could command the universal assent of mankind we might
expect it would be that the government of the Union though
limited in its powers is supreme within its sphere of action" and
in the same case said, "Should Congress under the pretext of
executing its power pass laws for the accomplishment of objects
not entrusted to the government it would be the painful duty
of this tribunal ... to say that such an act was not the law of
the land."
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The problem arises from the fact that great plenary powers
like taxation, appropriation and regulation of commerce among
the states, are given to the federal government without limi-
tation unless it be the due process clause of the 5th amendment.
Any one of these powers, it can be readily seen, if given full
meaning, can easily be used by Congress to take over most, if not
all, of the reserved power of the states. If Congress under its
power to regulate interstate commerce may keep out of inter-
state commerce all goods unless the owner meets any condition
which Congress may exact, or if it condition the spending of
money in the same way, then the distinction between the
granted and reserved power is gone, and the federal system
which is implicit in the constitution is no more.
Shortly after the Civil War this dilemma was presented to
the Supreme Court in another form. The 14th amendment
for the first time defined national citizenship. The amendment
was passed primarily to protect the negro against state aggres-
sion. It was claimed, and very logically, that this amendment
made national citizenship the primary citizenship and that all
those rights which belong to citizenship were now a part of
national instead of state citizenship. The amendment provided
also that no state should "make or enforce any law which shall
abridge the privileges and immunities of citizens of the United
States" and gave Congress power to enforce the amendment.
In this way the negro was to be protected in his civil rights. It
was pointed out that any other interpretation would make the
amendment meaningless. The Supreme Court admitted that
this might be so but steadfastly refused to accept such an inter-
pretation, because they saw that to do so would take away from
the states and transfer to Congress that vast area of police regu-
lation involved in the protection of all a man's civil rights. The
result was the great opinion of Justice Miller in the Slaughter
House Cases.
The same question arose later in Hammer v. Dagenhart.
Here Congress attempted to control the use of child labor by
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forbidding goods made with such labor entrance into interstate
commerce. The court again refused to uphold such an exercise
of power, feeling that to admit that Congress could refuse, for
any reason it pleased (subject possibly to "due process"), the
right to ship goods in interstate commerce would give to Con-
gress the power to take over most of the police powers of the
states.
In the recent Schecter case the court again saw the danger of
the reserved powers of the states being swallowed up in the
granted powers of the federal government. The Supreme
Court has by construction given to Congress extensive powers
in the field of interstate commerce. It has borne in mind the
statement of Marshall in Gibbons v. Ogden that, "This power
like all others vested in Congress is complete in itself, may be
exercised to its utmost extent and acknowledges no limitations
other than are prescribed in the constitution." It has decided
that under this power Congress may regulate purely intrastate
matters if they directly affect interstate commerce. It is these
decisions and this doctrine upon which reliance is made to
justify the Guffey Coal Bill and the Labor Relations Board Act.
But here again the court recognizes the question of degree and
that a line must somewhere be drawn. Said Justice Hughes in
this case: "If the commerce clause were construed to reach all
enterprises and transactions which could be said to have an in-
direct effect upon interstate commerce, the federal authority
would embrace practically all the activities of the people and
the authority of the state over its domestic concerns would exist
only by sufferance of the federal government," and Justice
Cardozo in the same case said, "There is a view of causation
that would obliterate the distinction between what is national
and what is local in the activities of commerce. Motion at the
outer rim is communicated perceptibly though minutely to
recorded instruments at the center . . . activities local in their
immediacy do not become interstate and national because of
distant repercussions."
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The reverse of this problem is seen in the conflict between
the exercise by the states of their police power and the power of
Congress over interstate commerce, though curiously but na-
turally enough the sympathies in this controversy, of those who
strongly favor the exercise of governmental power for general
welfare, is in favor of the states as against the power of the
federal government. Here their interest is not in a wide inter-
pretation of the federal power over interstate commerce as
claimed in the A.A.A. case but in a narrow interpretation as
against the power of the states. Marshall in Gibbons v. Ogden
intimated that so long as the states acted under their police
power their acts would be valid, but in this he was clearly
wrong, for the court soon saw that the states in so acting might
very seriously interfere with the power of Congress over inter-
state commerce and might even put a stop to such commerce
altogether. The U. S. Supreme Court sitting as the traditional
umpire in such controversies found itself at the same old job of
trying to maintain the plenary power of Congress and at the
same time the equally important power of the states to legislate
for the welfare of their people.
The functioning of the court in this problem is seen in the
recent case of Baldwin et al vs. Seely, Inc. (294 U.S. 511, 55
S. Ct. 497, 79 L. Ed. 1032, 1935). Here the state of New
York in trying to make effective its Milk Control Act found
it necessary to forbid the sale in New York of milk imported
from another state unless the price paid to the producer was
one that would be lawful upon a like transaction within the
state. One's sympathies are all with the State of New York
in this matter and yet the U. S. Supreme Court speaking
through Justice Cardozo held such legislation invalid. Said
Justice Cardozo, "On that assumption we are asked to say that
intervention will be upheld as a valid exercise by the state of its
internal police power though there is an incidental obstruction
to commerce between one state and another. This would eat up
the rule under the guise of an exception. Let such an exception
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be admitted and all that a state would have to do in times of
stress and strain is to say that its farmers and merchants and
workmen must be protected from competition from without lest
they go upon the poor relief list or perish altogether. To give
entrance to that excuse would be to invite a speedy end of our
national solidarity."
The same problem in another form is seen in the develop-
ment in recent years of the doctrine of "unconstitutional condi-
tions." A state has, it is said, the absolute power to keep foreign
corporations from coming into the state and doing intrastate
business as a corporation. Having this absolute power it may
grant it upon any condition it pleases to make even though the
condition be the submission to an otherwise unconstitutional
tax or the agreement that it will not take its cases to the federal
courts. For a long time the Supreme Court accepted this rea-
soning but finally it began to see where it would lead and laid
down the wholesome doctrine that a government even in the
exercise of an absolute power may not condition it upon the
yielding of a constitutional right. The application of this doc-
trine to the plenary power of taxation and appropriation can be
readily seen though it has not been mentioned in the discussion
of the A.A.A. decision.
The real question then in all these cases including the recent
decision under discussion is how far the fundamental principle
of the reserved power of the states and our federal system, im-
plicit in the constitution, and reaffirmed in the ioth amendment
is to be preserved. If it is to be preserved then it must constitute
a check upon the unlimited exercise of the powers granted to
Congress as well as those reserved to the states. Since neither
one should be pushed to the point where it seriously impairs
the other, it becomes, as it so often does in the law, a question
of degree.
There is always the danger in forming one's judgment that
irritation over a greatly desired immediate objective being
thwarted will lead one to overlook the more ultimate and
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fundamental issues involved. The Supreme Court no doubt
was as desirous as anyone that the negro's civil rights should
be protected, that child labor should be abolished and that the
farmer should be given greatly needed help, but the Supreme
Court also saw under the constitution the necessity of preserv-
ing the reserved power of the state and our federal system.
There is no doubt a real and difficult problem before us.
The constitution was drafted at a time when both politically and
industrially we were separated into units called states. We are
trying today to apply that constitution in a time when industri-
ally at least we are largely national and many questions call for
a national rule. The U. S. Supreme Court has in its statesman-
ship gone a long way by construction in making it possible for
that constitution to endure. As Marshall said, "It was intended
to endure for ages to come and consequently to be adapted to
the various crises of human affairs," but there is a limit to its
power of construction, particularly when it comes to the funda-
mental question of the federal system. If it is desired now to
change that system and centralize at Washington much if not
all of the power reserved to the states, it should be done frankly
and openly by an amendment and not by insistence upon court
decision. Whether when the real issue is shifted from the ques-
tion of the immediate objective to the fundamental question of
centralized power, the people will approve the latter no one
knows.
Justice Learned Hand, who is not only one of our greatest
judges but one of our greatest liberals as well, has put the issue
dearly in his opinion in the Schecter case in the U. S. Court of
Appeals, when he said, "It might or might not be a good thing
if Congress were supreme in all respects and the states merely
political divisions without more autonomy than it choose to
accord them; but that is not the skeleton or basic framework of
our system. To protect that framework there must be some
tribunal which can authoritatively apportion the powers of gov-
ernment and traditionally this is the duty of courts. It may
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indeed follow that the nation cannot as a unit meet any of the
great crises of its existence except war and that it must obtain
the concurrence of the separate states; but that to some extent
at any rate is implicit in the federation and the resulting weak-
nesses have not hitherto been thought to outweigh the dangers
of a completely centralized government. If the American
people have come to believe otherwise, Congress is not the ac-
credited organ to express their will to change."
There is one other point of this opinion in the A.A.A. deci-
sion that needs comment and that is the part that declares that
the taxing and spending power of Congress is not limited as
Madison so strongly claimed it was, to the field of the other
granted powers but extends as claimed by Hamilton and Story
to the whole field of general welfare. In this position the
minority concurs so it is now, for better or for worse, the unani-
mous opinion of the court; an opinion long anticipated but now
for the first time made authoritative. This is an immense con-
cession to federal power for it means that Congress has an
almost unlimited power of appropriation. So great is this power
and so capable is it of abuse that there are those who think it
may yet be the undoing of our democracy. Dean Inge has said
that the advent of universal suffrance means the end of truly
representative government. The so-called "gloomy dean" no
doubt was expressing the fear, alas borne out too much by
example, that representatives dependent upon this electorate for
their continuance in office would readily yield to pressure groups
and strive to win their favor by constantly increasing gifts of
public funds, the ultimate end of which would be ruin.
In a recent book entitled "The Twilight of the Supreme
Court," by Prof. Corwin of Princeton, is brought out the inter-
esting suggestion that the failure of the Supreme Court to put
any limits on the spending powers of Congressi its refusal, as
he expresses it, "to thrust its sickle into this dread field," is in
large part the explanation of the "twilight" of that court. "The
success," he says, "of the spending power in eluding all consti-
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tutional snares goes far to envelop the entire institution of
judicial review as well as its product constitutional law in an
atmosphere of unreality even of futility."
It is very possible that this case, so criticized today by those
who favor stronger federal power, will come to be, because of
this part of its decision, the most frequently cited case in support
of that power as exercised in the vast field of appropriation. It
is also very possible that the Supreme Court by daring as it has
in this case "to thrust its sickle into this dread field" will dis-
prove the suggestion of the twilight of that court, and it is also
very possible that the limitation laid down by Justice Stone that
the taxing and spending power of Congress "may not be used to
coerce action left to state control" is potentially the keenest
sickle of them all.
It may be said by some that, admitting all this to be true,
it is still possible to justify the A.A.A. legislation as being
within the framework of the federal system. The same thing
was said, and ably said, in regard to the other legislation men-
tioned. No attempt is made here to argue that question but
only to make clear, what it is feared is oftentimes overlooked,
that back of all these acts of legislation, desirable as they may
be in their immediate objective, lies a broader and deeper prob-
lem and that is the keeping in balance the powers of the federal
government and the powers of the states. Either one in the
exercise of powers admittedly possessed may, if no limit is
drawn, completely swamp the other. There must be an umpire.
True, Thomas Jefferson in the celebrated Kentucky Reso-
lutions declared there was no common umpire and in the ab-
sence of such an umpire "each party has equal right to pledge
for itself as well of infraction as of the mode and manner of
redress." This is another name for the doctrine of nullification,
a doctrine long since repudiated. The only other alternative is
the Supreme Court which now for over a century has been per-
forming the delicate task, to use the words of Thomas Reed
Powell, of "Umpiring the Federal System." A realization of
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this fact will not, of course, necessarily lead to an agreement
in all cases with the decision rendered but it will temper one's
emotional outbursts when some particular act of legislation is
declared invalid.
